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I. HOSPITALS
A. LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
N Baptist Memorial Hospital System v. Sampson,1 plaintiff went to
the emergency room of Southeast Baptist Hospital after being bitten
by a brown recluse spider. On two separate visits to Baptist's emer-
* Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law; Of Counsel,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998), rev'g 940 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997).
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gency room, two physicians diagnosed her condition as an uncomplicated
allergic reaction and prescribed pain killers and antihistamines. After her
condition continued to worsen, the plaintiff went to a different hospital
where the correct diagnosis was made and she received life-saving treat-
ment. Plaintiff then sued the hospital system that included Southeast
Baptist Hospital on the theory that it was vicariously liable for the second
emergency room physicians' negligence. 2 Both parties agreed that the
second physician was an independent contractor, not an employee of the
hospital, and that the hospital could be liable only if the plaintiff could
satisfy the elements of ostensible agency, apparent authority, agency by
estoppel, or some related legal theory.
The court of appeals had ruled that two separate theories of vicarious
liability applied. The first was an agency theory, either "agency by estop-
pel ' 3 or "apparent agency."' 4 According to the court, the former theory
requires (i) that the hospital "hold out" (by some act or omission) the
emergency-room physician as an agent of the hospital, (ii) giving rise to
the plaintiff's reasonable belief that an agency relationship exists, (iii)
upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied. 5 Under "apparent agency," on
the other hand, a plaintiff need only show that: (i) the plaintiff looked to
the hospital, rather than to the individual physician, for her care; and (ii)
the hospital held out the physician as its agent.6 The court concluded
that, at least as to the theory of apparent agency, a sufficient factual
question existed (regarding the sufficiency of the hospital's posted dis-
claimers of any agency relationship between the emergency room physi-
cians and the hospital) to warrant reversal of the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in the hospital's favor.
7
The court of appeals' second theory of vicarious liability was that a
hospital's operation of an emergency room creates a nondelegable duty
on the part of the hospital to provide emergency medical services with
reasonable care. 8 Under this theory, a hospital may not escape liability
for torts that occur in the emergency room by the simple expedient of
hiring independent contractors and then delegating the operation of the
emergency room to them.9 The court justified this conclusion by resort to
"public policy and fundamental fairness [as well as] .. .the simple fact
that an injured party must rely on a hospital's emergency room because
there is no other place to go."' 0
2. Plaintiff also sued the two emergency room physicians for medical malpractice and
brought other negligence claims against the hospital. After a variety of voluntary dismis-
sals, severance of claims and parties, and partial appeals, only the vicarious liability issue
was presented to the supreme court for its decision. See id. at 947.
3. See Sampson, 940 S.W.2d at 131 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 267 (1958)).
4. See id. (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965)).
5. See id. at 132.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 134.
8. See id. at 136-38.
9. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1384-85 (Alaska 1987).
10. Sampson, 940 S.W.2d at 138.
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The supreme court rejected both lines of the court of appeals' analysis
and reversed.' The court ruled that the governing law in the case was
provided by the three elements of "ostensible agency" as set out in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency. 12 Specifically, the court rejected the
idea that what the court of appeals called "apparent agency" was the law
in Texas:
While a few courts of appeals have referred to section 429 [of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS], it has never before been
adopted in this state by any appellate court. To the extent that the
[RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS] section 429 proposes a con-
flicting standard for establishing liability, we expressly decline to
adopt it in Texas. 1
3
Applying the three-pronged test of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, the supreme court ruled that "the [h]ospital took no affirmative
act to make actual or prospective patients think the emergency room phy-
sicians were its agents or employees, and did not fail to take reasonable
efforts to disabuse them of such a notion. 14
The supreme court also rejected the court of appeals' suggestion that
Texas should "eliminat[e] the liability loopholes currently available to
hospitals in the emergency room setting . . . [and take] the full leap-
imposing a nondelegable duty on hospitals for the negligence of emer-
gency room physicians. ' 15 The supreme court concluded that the crea-
tion of such a duty was unnecessary to protect patients, who retained the
ability to sue emergency-room physicians for medical malpractice and
hospitals for any breach of the tort duties that they owe directly to
patients.16
The rule adopted in this case by the supreme court considerably nar-
rows a hospital's risk of vicarious liability for the torts of their emergency
room physicians. Read literally, the three elements of an ostensible
agency claim will seldom be satisfied. Emergency room signs (even those
the plaintiff claims she did not see or read) and consent form disclaimers
(including those the plaintiff says she did not read or understand) will
defeat most, if not all, claims of ostensible agency. This result appears to
be based on the judicial belief that patients in an emergency room are in
the right frame of mind (e.g., conscious, alert, and discerning) to appreci-
11. See Sampson, 969 S.W.2d at 949-50.
12. The supreme court somewhat impatiently brushed aside the notion that there are
any differences among the terms "ostensible agency," "apparent agency," ".apparent au-
thority," and "agency by estoppel." See id. at 947 n.2.
13. Id. at 949.
14. Id. at 950. The court's reference to "no affirmative act" suggests that the mere
provision of emergency medical services through emergency room physicians hired by the
hospital cannot, by itself, constitute a "holding out" for purposes of the ostensible agency
doctrine. In addition, the hospital included a disclaimer of any agency relationship in its
informed-consent form (which the plaintiff signed without, according to her affidavit in the
case, reading it) and posted signs in the emergency room stating that the physicians who
worked there are independent contractors.
15. Sampson, 940 S.W.2d at 136.
16. See Sampson, 969 S.W.2d at 949.
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ate the legal limitations suggested by the hospital's signs and forms. It
also assumes that emergency patients are free to choose to go to another
hospital if they are not happy with the legal limitations imposed by the
hospital to which they have driven or been transported. With respect to
emergency medicine, the analysis required by the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY and adopted by the supreme court appears to take
place in a sort of "Never-Never Land" that bears scant resemblance to
the real world. 17 In the real world, emergency patients go (or are taken
to) the nearest available emergency room or, in extreme situations, to the
emergency room that has the specialized (hospital-based) capabilities re-
quired to treat the patient's condition. The choice of hospital is seldom
made because of the identify of individual physicians, but rather because
of the (usually well advertised and promoted) capacity of the hospital to
provide the needed service. In short, the real world actually resembles
the picture painted by section 429 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS and by the nondelegation doctrine, but it will apparently be awhile
before Texas catches up to the real world.
B. LICENSURE
On August 7, 1998, the Texas Department of Health (TDH) published
in the Texas Register a massive repeal of most of its hospital licensing
rules and adopted new rules to take their place. 18 The rules' changes
were intended to update TDH's hospital licensing rules and standards, to
bring them into compliance with 1997 legislative changes, to streamline
aspects of the licensing process, to incorporate the Medicare program's
conditions of participation, and to establish new minimum standards for
certain facilities. Similarly comprehensive changes were made to TDH's
rules governing the licensing of abortion facilities. 19
II. PHYSICIANS
A. DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES
1. Duty to Warn
In Praesel v. Johnson,20 the Texas Supreme Court held that a physician
17. The court's analysis not only seems curiously out of touch with the real world, but
it also contradicts its own premises. For example, the court asserts that the physicians'
emergency medical services are billed by the physicians themselves, not by the hospital.
See id. at 950. But most, if not all, patients will be ignorant of this fact until after the
services have been provided; thus, the identity of the doctors as the billing entity could not
possibly negate a reasonable belief as to the existence of an agency relationship between
the physicians and the hospital upon which the patient relied in coming to the emergency
room for care.
18. See 23 Tex. Reg. 8042-8089 (1998) (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 505.11 and various sections of 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 139.1-139.169).
19. See id. at 81.46-81.74 (1998) (to be codified at 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 139.1-
139.60) (Tex. Dep't of Health).




owes no duty to third parties to warn an epileptic patient not to drive or
to report the patient's condition to state motor vehicle authorities. It re-
versed a lower court ruling that a physician who knew of, and treated his
patient for, epileptic seizures could be liable for the wrongful death of a
motorist if the physician failed to warn the patient not to drive or failed
to advise his patient to notify state authorities of the patient's dangerous
medical condition.
21
Texas statute permits, but does not require, treating physicians to refer
to the Texas Department of Public Safety or the Department's Medical
Advisory Board patients who have had an epileptic seizure within the
past three years.22 The supreme court reasoned that this regulation (and
the statute that authorizes it23) creates an exception to the traditional rule
of physician-patient confidentiality but does not impose a per se standard
of care that requires reporting.24
The court also refused to create a common-law duty to third parties
upon physicians to warn a patient with epilepsy not to drive.25 In doing
so, the supreme court continued a line of cases in which it has refused to
impose duties to third parties upon physicians. 26 The court noted that
epileptic patients themselves already have a duty to contact the Depart-
ment of Public Safety to permit a determination of their fitness and safety
as drivers. Against the backdrop of this legal requirement, the court
continued:
The consequences of placing a legal duty on physicians to warn may
subject them to substantial liability even though their warnings may
not be effective to eliminate the risk in many cases. Unfortunately,
many patients do not heed the admonitions of their physicians even
though the consequences may be life-threatening to the patient or
others.2
7
Thus, the court concluded, "the benefit of warning an epileptic not to
drive is incremental but . . . the consequences of imposing a duty are
great." 28
21. See Praesel, 925 S.W.2d at 259-60.
22. See 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 15.58 (1998).
23. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 12.096(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (au-
thorizing physicians to provide to the Department of Public Safety or the Medical Advi-
sory Board identifying information about a patient "whom the physician has diagnosed as
having a disorder.., specified in a rule of the Department").
24. See Praesel, 967 S.W.2d at 394-96.
25. See id. at 398.
26. See id. at 396.
27. Id. at 398.
28. Id. The court's assumption on this factual issue is an interesting one. Apart from
implicitly indulging a stereotype of patients with epilepsy, see id. at 399 (Enoch, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the court's "conclusion is based upon an assumption that is wholly un-
supported in the record. This Court does not know what epileptics are supposed to know
about whether they should ever drive a car." Id.), the court further assumes that a patient
who is inclined to overlook the risks posed to others by his medical condition would not be
more than "incrementally" influenced by strong warnings from his or her physician. The
law's hypothetical "reasonable person," even the hypothetical "reasonable person with ep-
ilepsy," ought to be held to a higher standard than is implied by the court's approach. In
1999] 1263
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The supreme court was careful to carve out of its decision the question
whether mental health professionals have a so-called "Tarasoff 9 duty" to
warn identifiable third parties whom a patient has threatened to harm.
31)
Noting that three lower courts in Texas have found the existence of such a
duty to warn, the court declined to comment on the question other than
to suggest that the imposition of a new tort duty turns on an close exami-
nation of the context and facts of each case.
2. Duty to Protect
In Van Horn v. Chambers,31 the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a phy-
sician's duty to exercise reasonable care in the diagnosis and treatment of
a patient is not a duty that is also owed to third parties outside the physi-
cian-patient relationship.
The case began when a patient was taken to the Hermann Hospital
emergency room and was admitted for the treatment of seizures and alco-
hol withdrawal. The day after his admission to the neurological critical
care unit (NCCU), the patient was seen by Dr. Van Horn, a neurologist.
During the patient's second day in the NCCU, Dr. Van Horn concluded
that the patient no longer needed critical care services or physical re-
straints and ordered that the patient be transferred to a private bed on a
general medical floor.
The next day, the patient tried to leave the hospital and was pursued
and detained by two hospital workers and a medical student. During the
ensuing struggle, all four fell through a grill that covered an air shaft and
landed on the concrete floor twenty-four feet below. One employee and
the medical student died; the second employee and the patient were
injured.
The surviving parents of the deceased employee, along with the injured
employee, sued Dr. Van Horn, alleging negligence and gross negligence.
Although there were many claims in their complaint, the supreme court
summed them up this way: "The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaints is
that Van Horn knew or should have known that [the patient] posed a
danger to others and should have treated him accordingly. '32 Specifi-
cally, they complained that Van Horn failed to perceive that the patient
posed a threat to the safety of those around him and therefore, by send-
ing the patient to an unsecured room and ordering the discontinuation of
physical restraints, failed to treat the patient properly.
addition, the court's hand-wringing over the potentially great liability that would be im-
posed on physicians if the court were to recognize a duty to warn cuts equally against its
conclusion. In light of the potentially catastrophic consequences that might result from a
failure to warn, requiring the physician to warn the patient (and nothing more) would be a
relatively mild response from the tort system while a simple one for physicians to satisfy.
29. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
30. See Praesel, 967 S.W.2d at 397.
31. 970 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. 1998), rev'g Chambers v. Hermann Hosp. Est., 961
S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 546 (1998).
32. Id. at 545.
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The trial court granted Dr. Van Horn's motion for summary judgment,
but the court of appeals reversed, 33 holding that the physician owed a
duty to non-patient third parties on the basis of the supreme court's opin-
ion in Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark.34 In Otis, the supreme court held
that an employer owed a duty of care to third parties who were killed by
an inebriated employee who was driving home from work, even though
the employee was not acting within the scope of his employment, was not
on the employer's premises, and was not using the employer's property.35
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, refusing to extend the
rule in Otis to the physician-patient relationship. 36 In so doing, the court
gave at least three reasons for agreeing with the lower courts in Texas
that have refused since 1984 to apply Otis to physician and non-patient
third parties. 3
7
1. Section 315(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 38 requires a
special relationship before there can be a duty to control the actions of a
third party. Although the Texas Supreme Court has found such a special
relationship between parent and child, master and servant, and independ-
ent contractor and contractee, it declined to find such a relationship be-
tween physicians and their patients. 39 Presumably, then, if Dr. Van Horn
owed no duty to control to this patient, he owed no such duty to the
plaintiffs.
2. Section 315(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts40 states that
some special relationships give rise to a right of protection, and subse-
quent sections of the RESTATEMENT give specific examples, such as par-
ent-child 4' and master-servant. 42 The supreme court could find no
evidence that Dr. Van Horn had any contact with the deceased or injured
employees and therefore concluded that no special relationship could
possibly have come into existence.43
3. Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 4 imposes a duty
of care on those who take control of dangerous persons. The supreme
court observed that "[w]e have not adopted section 319 as the law in
Texas ' 45 and then declined to do so in this case. The court noted that
section 319 "does not apply to a case where there exists no inherent right
to control another," 46 as distinguished from the case of employers and
their employees. Having already concluded that physicians have no in-
33. See Chambers, 961 S.W.2d at 177, 180, 193.
34. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1984).
35. See id. at 311.
36. See Van Horn, 970 S.W.2d at 546.
37. See id. at 546-47.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a) (1965).
39. See Van Horn, 970 S.W.2d at 546-47.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(b) (1965).
41. See id. § 316.
42. See id. § 317.
43. See Van Horn, 970 S.W.2d at 547.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).




herent right to control their patients, the supreme court held that section
319 could not apply to them either.
47
B. LICENSURE
In a case of apparently first impression, the Amarillo Court of Appeals
held in Attaya v. Shoukfeh48 that when a physician who reports what he
believes to be misconduct by another physician to the State Board of
Medical Examiners, the reporting physician enjoys absolute immunity
from liability in a defamation action brought by the second physician.
The immunity is derived from the common-law privilege for those who
testify in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The court acknowledged
that the Medical Practice Act deems statements to the board to be privi-
leged so long as they are made "without malice" 49 and "in good
faith" 50-in short, the statute cloaks reporting physicians with a qualified
immunity. The court concluded, however, that the Medical Practice Act
"does not repeal, destroy, diminish or supercede common law absolute
immunity."5 1 The court's only explanation for this curious statement was
that qualified immunity simply does not provide sufficient protection to
encourage reporting by physicians. While this is a cogent enough reason
for the legislature to amend the Medical Practice Act, it is a tenuous basis
for a court to ignore the Medical Practice Act. Moreover, if the legisla-
ture believed that common-law absolute immunity would survive the en-
actment of the Medical Practice Act, one wonders why the legislature
bothered to include a rule of qualified immunity for reporting physicians.
To hold that the common-law rule of absolute immunity survived flies in
the face of another common-law rule: the one that requires courts to
avoid construing a statute in a manner that renders the statute, or any
part of it, a nullity.
52
In Levy v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners,53 the Board of
Medical Examiners reversed or threw out numerous findings of fact by its
administrative law judge in a disciplinary case against a physician. The
version of the state Administrative Procedure Act in effect at the time of
the board's decision, however, permitted a state agency to change an
AL's findings and conclusions "only for reasons of policy."' 54 The
board's compliance with this provision consisted of its invocation of the
47. See id.
48. 962 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no writ).
49. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.06(m) (Vernon 1998).
50. Id. § 5.06(t)(1).
51. Attaya, 962 S.W.2d at 239.
52. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 485
(Tex. 1998) ("But we do not lightly presume that the Legislature may have done a useless
act.").
53. 966 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
54. See id. at 815 (quoting TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (Vernon Supp.
1997)). In 1997, the legislature amended section 2001.058(e) to read:
A state agency may change a finding of fact or conclusion of law made by the
administrative law judge, or may vacate or modify an order issued by the
administrative judge, only if the agency determines:
1266 [Vol. 52
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board rule that permits the board-as a matter of policy-to change an
AL's findings when the board concludes, inter alia, that the findings are
erroneous, against the weight of the evidence, based on unsound medical
principles, or insufficient to protect the public interest.55 The court of
appeals held that more is required of an agency that reverses its AL's
findings and conclusions than a simple reference to the demands of
policy:
[P]ublic policy is enhanced when the Board elaborates on why an
Al's finding of fact or conclusion of law is based on "unsound med-
ical principles" or is "not sufficient to protect the public interest"
because such elaboration will help guide future AL's in these types
of proceedings and will enhance the public's knowledge of what con-
stitutes inappropriate physician behavior.56
The court's admonition presumably has equal force in light of the legis-
lature's recent amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act. It will
be interesting to see how the board responds to the court's challenge in
future cases.
III. NURSES: WHISTLE-BLOWER PROTECTION
Section 11 of article 4525a of the Nursing Practice Act 57 protects nurses
against retaliation "for reporting under this [statute]. '58 The question in
Clark v. Texas Home Health, Inc.59 was whether an employer could es-
cape liability for disciplining three nurses after they informed the em-
ployer they were going to report a nurse's involvement in a patient's
death to the Board of Vocational Nurse Examiners, but before the report
was actually filed.
The supreme court ruled that the statute's use of the word "reporting"
was broad enough to include the circumstances of this case and that the
nurses therefore had a statutory claim against the employer for retalia-
tion.60 Specifically, the court ruled that (i) telling the employer that they
(1) that the administrative law judge did not properly apply or interpret
applicable law, agency rules, written policies provided under Subsection
(c), or prior administrative decisions;
(2) that a prior administrative decision on which the administrative law
judge relied is incorrect or should be changed; or
(3) that a technical error in a finding of fact should be changed.
The agency shall state in writing the specific reason and legal basis for a
change made under this subsection.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (applicable to contested cases
before an occupational licensing agency filed on or after the effective date of the amend-
ment (Sept. 1, 1997)).
55. See 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 187.34(d) (1998).
56. Levy, 966 S.W.2d at 816.
57. The Nursing Practice Act is all of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. ch. 7 (Vernon Supp.
1999), which includes articles 4512 through 4528c.
58. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4525a, § 11(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (emphasis
added).
59. 971 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. 1998), afg in part and rev'g in part 940 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1997).
60. See id. at 437.
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intended to file the report, plus (ii) subsequently filing the report with the
nursing board constituted filing a report within the meaning of the stat-
ute. The employer could not escape liability under section 11 by disci-
plining the nurses after step (i) but before they had a chance to perform
step (ii).61 To hold otherwise, wrote the court, would "discourage an em-
ployee from informing an employer that a nurse poses a potential threat
to patients" 62 and would frustrate "the legislative intent behind the re-
porting requirements and the protection afforded by Section 11: ensuring
a safe and monitored system of nursing care."
'63
The importance of the court's broad reading of section 11 was under-
scored by another whistleblower case decided this past year. In Austin v.
Healthtrust, Inc.-The Hospital Co.,64 a nurse reported another nurse's in-
appropriate use of drugs to her supervisor. According to her complaint,
she was then subjected to "extreme scrutiny" and ultimately fired, alleg-
edly in retaliation for her whistleblowing.65 Because she did not report
the nurse's alleged misconduct to the nursing board, the plaintiff could
not avail herself of the statutory retaliation claim in section 11.66 And
because she was fired in 1992, about one year before the legislature ad-
ded a general protection for hospital employees who report illegal activ-
ity to their employer,67 she had no cause of action under the new law
either. 68 Thus, her only basis for a suit against her former employer was a
common-law claim for retaliation, which the supreme court declined to
recognize. 69
IV. MEDICAL LIABILITY
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act 70 (Act) con-
tains a relatively straightforward two-year statute of limitations provision
(section 10.01)71 that has caused no end of difficulty in its application.
One supreme court decision during the past year confirmed an already
settled point of law, 72 while two other decisions raised interesting policy
61. See id.
62. Id. at 438.
63. Id.
64. 967 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1998), affg 951 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997).
65. See id. at 400-01.
66. See id. at 402.
67. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.134 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
68. See Austin, 967 S.W.2d at 402-03.
69. See id. at 402.
70. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1999).
71. See id. § 10.01.
72. The supreme court's decision in Husain v. Khatib, 964 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1998) (per
curiam), rev'g 949 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1997), came with a reminder that the
three alternative beginning points for measuring the two-year limitations period are not
intended to give plaintiffs their choice of the most favorable provision. If the date on
which a defendant's negligence can fairly be ascertained, then that is the date the statute
begins to run. See id. at 919. If that date cannot be determined with any certainty, either




1. Injury to a Fetus
In Brown v. Shwarts,73 the supreme court applied section 10.01 to a
medical malpractice claim for injuries caused to a fetus. The defendant,
Dr. Shwarts, allegedly failed to notice during an in-office examination
that Christina Michelle Brown's membranes had ruptured, despite her
complaints of "nausea and continuing headaches, cough, and wetness in
her pants. '74 Four days later, after a second physician made the correct
diagnosis, Ms. Brown was admitted to the hospital, where she gave birth
to Dillon, a premature baby boy who died the next day. Two years and
seventy-six days later-one day after the expiration of the statutory limi-
tations period in section 10.0175-Ms. Brown and her husband filed
wrongful death and survival claims against Dr. Shwarts. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the court of appeals
affirmed, finding that the limitations period for the wrongful death claim
began to run when Dr. Shwarts allegedly failed to discover that Ms.
Brown's membranes had ruptured, even though that was four days before
Dillon was born (and died).76
The supreme court affirmed with respect to the wrongful death claim
but reversed as to the survival claim.77 The court ruled that section 10.01
governed both claims but produces a different result when applied to the
statutory wrongful death claim than when applied to derivative survival
claim. The limitations period for the wrongful death claim, the court rea-
soned, could just as logically begin running when Dillon was in utero as
when he was born.78 Since there is no extension of the limitations period
will be used as an approximation of the date the negligence occurred. See id. In Husain,
plaintiffs complained that their physician's failure to order tests or to involve specialists
resulted in a missed diagnosis of cancer. Eventually, in August 1992, the defendant or-
dered a mammogram, some eleven months after plaintiff's last visit to the defendant. Since
plaintiff's claim was based on the physician's nonfeasance, however, the penultimate visit
in September 1991 was the last date on which defendant's negligence could have occurred,
and that was more than two years prior to the filing of the medical malpractice action
against the physician. See id. at 919-20.
73. 968 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1998), afg in part and rev'g in part, 929 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1996).
74. Id. at 333.
75. In addition to the two-year limitations period provided by § 10.01, TEX. REv. Crv.
STAT. ANN. § 4.01(c) tolls the statute for 75 days if notice of the claim is provided more
than 60 days prior to filing the action, as required by § 4.01(a). Ms. Brown filed the statu-
tory notice on December 9, 1991. After settlement negotiations proved fruitless, she filed
the action on February 17, 1994. The trial court ruled that the two-year statutory limita-
tions period (including the 75-day tolling period) expired on February 17, 1994. See
Brown, 929 S.W.2d at 611.
76. See Brown, 929 S.W.2d at 614. Although the survival action was not separately
analyzed, the court of appeals apparently treated both of the plaintiffs' claims as wrongful
death claims based on medical malpractice and intended their affirmance to include both
claims.
77. See Brown, 968 S.W.2d at 333.
78. This conclusion required the court to hold that the fetus was a "patient" and there
existed a physician-patient relationship between the fetus and Dr. Shwarts within the
meaning of article 4590i. See id. at 334. Justice Gonzalez (in his concurring opinion)
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when the decedent is a minor,79 similarly, there is no extension when the
decedent is a fetus at the time of injury.
The limitations period on the parents' survival action began to run on
the same day as the wrongful death action, but because their claim is
derivative of Dillon's claim, they get the benefit of the tolling provision of
section 10.01, which gave Dillon until he was fourteen years old to file his
claim. That tolled the running of the limitations until he died, giving his
parents four more days to file their survival action than their wrongful
death action. 81)
2. Misnomer and Misidentification
In a highly contentious (6-5) ruling, the Dallas Court of Appeals ruled
that a suit commenced against a neurologist did not toll the statute of
limitations with respect to the neurologist's professional association
(P.A.). 8 1 Thus, although plaintiff's medical malpractice claim was timely
filed against the neurologist, his later attempt to add the P.A. (which em-
ployed the physician, and of which the physician was the sole share-
holder, director, and officer) more than two years after the alleged
malpractice occurred was doomed. The court did not address plaintiff's
argument that the late joinder should be excused on the ground of mis-
identification (because misidentification had not been specifically argued
at trial82), which leaves open the question whether the doctrine of mis-
identification would have been more successful than the doctrine of
either misnomer or assumed name. The more difficult and interesting
question turns on the Act's statement that its two-year limitations period
applies "[n]otwithstanding any other law."'83 Rule 28 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure permits an "individual doing business under an as-
sumed name [to] be sued in its ... assumed or common name [and] on a
motion by any party.., the true name may be substituted. '84 The major-
ity construed this rule as the type of law that the legislature intended to
supersede with section 10.01.85 The dissenters, on the other hand,
mounted a valiant but losing effort to save Rule 28 from section 10.01. In
their view, Rule 28 does not extend the statutory limitations period; it
simply allows for pleadings to be cleaned up in actions that were timely
filed against professional corporations that have been sued in their com-
pointed to the tension between this holding and the court's previous holdings that under
the Texas wrongful death statute, there can be no cause of action for the death of a fetus.
See id. at 335-36 (citing Pietila v. Crites, 851 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1993); Blackman v. Langford,
795 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1990); Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503
(Tex. 1987); and Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Lobdell, 726 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1987)).
79. See id. at 334 (citing Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.
1996)).
80. See id. at 335.
81. See Hyson v. Chilkewitz, 971 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. granted).
82. See id. at 568-69
83. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
84. TEX. R. Civ. P. 28.
85. See Hyson, 971 S.W.2d at 572.
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mon or assumed name.8 6 The mistake made by plaintiff's counsel in Hy-
son is a common, if not everyday, mistake; often the mistake is caught
before the limitations period expires. For cases, like Hyson, where that
does not occur, the supreme court needs to tell us whether Rule 28 saves
the plaintiff's action or is irrelevant.
B. TORT CLAIMS AcT
In Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley,87 the
supreme court had yet another occasion to describe and apply the vexing
Tort Claims Act that waives the state's sovereign immunity with respect
to "personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible
personal or real property. '88 In Bossley, the plaintiffs' decedent was hos-
pitalized after attempting to commit suicide. The patient escaped
through one unlocked door and another open one and subsequently
killed himself while being pursued by hospital employees. The Dallas
Court of Appeals had held that the patient's death involved the "condi-
tion or use" of the two doors and therefore sovereign immunity was
waived by the Tort Claims Act.8 9
The supreme court reversed, holding that the harm to the decedent was
not proximately caused by the condition or use of the hospital's doors in
their unlocked or open state, but rather by the failure of hospital person-
nel to restrain their patient once they knew he was still suicidal.90 Justices
Abbott and Spector dissented on the ground that the majority applied an
inappropriate standard of proximate cause and that, under the correct
standard, a question of fact was raised that could only be resolved at trial,
not by summary judgment.91
C. NATURAL DEATH Acr
In the first reported case under the twenty-year-old Natural Death
Act,92 the Houston Court of Appeals ruled that the defendants-physi-
cians and hospitals that allegedly treated a neurologically devastated
newborn in contravention of her parents' express wishes-were immune
under the statute from civil liability. In Stolle v. Baylor College of
86. See id. at 575-76.
87. 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998), rev'g 934 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1995).
88. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1997).
89. See Bossley, 934 S.W.2d at 695-96.
90. See Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343.
91. See id. at 344. The majority claimed that the unlocked and open doors "permitted
[decedent's] escape but did not cause his death." Id. at 343. It is difficult to see how the
same could not be said for the staff's failure to restrain the decedent, which the majority
argued was "[t]he real substance of plaintiffs' complaint" Id. The majority never ad-
dressed the dissenters' point that the condition or use of the hospital's doors were at least a
contributing cause to the patient's death, and that serious harm was certainly a foreseeable
consequence of leaving the doors unlocked or open, other than to assert that the condition
or use of the hospital doors was "too attenuated from [his] death to be said to have caused
it." Id.
92. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. art. 672 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1999).
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Medicine93 a child was born with a grade IV left intraventricular hemor-
rhage and a grade II right intraventricular hemorrhage resulting in irre-
versible brain damage and a neurological deficit. On that basis, the
baby's attending physician ordered that she was not to receive chest com-
pressions, intubation, or cardiac medications, after which the parents exe-
cuted a directive to physicians pursuant to the Natural Death Act.
94
Despite the parents' clear and consistent pattern of requesting that no
extraordinary measures be used to save their daughter's life or to keep
her alive if she were determined to have a terminal condition, the baby
was resuscitated when she stopped breathing and her pulse slowed after
regurgitating her food. The parents sued a variety of hospitals and health
care providers for eleven allegedly negligent acts or omissions, 95 all of
which the court of appeals characterized as boiling down to one basic
claim: the defendants failed to effectuate the directive the parents exe-
cuted pursuant to the Natural Death Act.96 Since the parents' claims all
fell under the Natural Death Act, the court reasoned that the defendants
were cloaked in the immunity provided by section 672.016, which pro-
vides for civil and criminal immunities for failing to effectuate the direc-
tive of a qualified patient.97 Although there was disagreement at trial
over whether the baby had a terminal condition and was therefore a qual-
ified patient, the court observed (correctly) that defendants won either
way. If she were a qualified patient, the immunity provision governed the
parents' claims; if not, the precondition for withholding life-sustaining
treatment in the parents' directive was not met and the defendants could
not be liable for failing to effectuate the directive.
98
93. 981 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet denied).
94. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.006 (Vernon 1992) provides that par-
ents may execute a directive on behalf of a qualified patient under the age of 18 years. A
"qualified patient" is one who has been certified by two physicians (her attending physi-
cian and one other) to have a terminal condition. See id. § 672.002(8).
95. See Stolle, 981 S.W.2d at 711.
96. See id. at 713.
97. See id. at 713-14; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.016(b) (Vernon
1992). Section 672.016 is a curious provision. It begins by providing immunity from civil
and criminal liability for failure to effectuate a directive the existence of which the defend-
ant was unaware. See id. § 672.016(a). It then provides the same immunities for failure to
effectuate a directive whose existence was known to the defendant. See id. § 672.016(b).
In addition, while the immunities provided for effectuating a qualified patient's directive
are qualified by the phrase "unless negligent," see id. § 672.015, and the Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care statute's immunity provision is qualified by "due care" and
"good faith" requirements, see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.010 (Vernon
1997), there are no such limits on the immunities provided for failing to effectuate a pa-
tient's directive. This will change January 1, 2000, when TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 166.045(b) takes effect. See 1999 TEX. S.B. 1260 § 1.03.
98. See Stolle, 981 S.W.2d at 713. Recall that section 672.006 specifies that parents
may execute a directive on behalf of a "qualified [minor] patient." Although the appellate
court notes that "[it is undisputed that none of the treating physicians classified [the
baby's] condition as terminal," see Stolle, 981 S.W.2d at 713, the court does not consider
whether that fact means that the baby was not a qualified patient at the time the directive
was executed by her parents and that the directive was, therefore, a nullity. Since the
existence of a "directive" is a prerequisite to obtaining the immunity provided by section
672.016, and "directive" is defined as "an instruction made under Section ... 672.006,"
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V. MANAGED CARE: LIABILITY
In 1997 the Texas legislature enacted Senate Bill 386,99 the Health Care
Liability Act, hailed as the first state law in the country to permit individ-
uals to sue health insurance carriers, health maintenance organizations,
or other managed care entities for damages proximately caused by the
entity's negligence when making a health care treatment decision. In ad-
dition to providing for tort liability, the Act also created an independent
review process to evaluate adverse benefit determinations. 100
The Act was almost immediately challenged in federal court, primarily
on the ground of ERISA preemption.10' In an opinion that will be sub-
jected to extensive appellate scrutiny at the Fifth Circuit, District Judge
Vanessa Gilmore upheld the liability provision of the Act but held the
independent review process to be preempted. 10 2
The court reasoned that the liability provision is not preempted be-
cause (a) tort liability for medical treatment decisions is an area of tradi-
tional state regulation and (b) the law excludes ERISA plans from its
definition of a managed care entity. 1°3 The Act's independent review
provisions, on the other hand, "improperly mandate the administration of
employee benefits"'1 4 in violation of Congress' policy that ERISA alone
be the source of a uniform, national system of benefits administration.
VI. MEDICAL RECORDS
A. CONFIDENTIALITY: HIV 10 5
Adalberto Balderas was a hemophiliac who contracted HIV infection,
presumably from injections of Factor VIII, a clotting factor administered
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.002(4) (Vernon 1992), there is at least an argu-
ment that the parents' claim does not arise under the Natural Death Act and that the
statute's immunity section should not be applied in this case.
99. Senate Bill 386 is codified at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. chap. 88
(Vernon Supp. 1999) and amends portions of the Insurance Code, including the Health
Maintenance Organization Act. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 20A.12 & 20A.12A
(Vernon Supp. 1999).
100. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 88.003 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
101. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1994), preempts state laws that relate to employee benefits plans, including those
that offer health insurance benefits. See id. § 1144(a). ERISA preemption is modified by a
"savings clause," which preserves state laws that regulate insurance. See id.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A). Even those laws, however, are preempted to the extent they affect em-
ployer's self-insured plans, which are deemed not to be insurance companies for purposes
of the savings clause. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
102. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex.
1998).
103. See id. at 610-14.
104. Id. at 625.
105. In addition to the case discussed in the text of this section, another significant
event during the Survey year was the Texas Department of Health's (TDH) proposal to
begin requiring that HIV and AIDS reporting shall include the patient's name, along with
other statistical and demographic information. See 23 Tex. Reg. 7696 (1998) (to be codified
at 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 97.131-.134, 97.139, 97.146) (proposed July 31, 1998). Until
now, the patient's name was reportable only for patients under the age of 13 years. The
change was proposed because the TDH found the Unique Identifier reporting system,
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to him in the 1980s through, but not directly from, Santa Rosa Health
Care Corporation. 0 6 Between 1986 and 1989, Santa Rosa sent seven
written notices to Balderas requesting that he come in to be tested for,
among other things, HIV infection. Balderas did not go in for the tests
but was determined to be HIV-positive in December 1989. In 1991
Balderas and his former wife, Linda Garcia (to whom he was married
from 1989 to 1990), sued Santa Rosa for its failure to notify them of
Balderas' possible HIV infection. Balderas died in 1993 and his estate
voluntarily dismissed his claims against Santa Rosa, leaving only Ms. Gar-
cia's claims for adjudication.11 7 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to Santa Rosa, and the court of appeals reversed, holding (1) that
Santa Rosa owed a duty to Garcia to warn her of the risk of infection
from Balderas, and (2) that a fact issue existed as to the reasonableness of
Santa Rosa's efforts to warn Garcia.
10 8
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and held that Santa Rosa owed no
duty to Garcia to warn her of the risk of HIV infection. Texas had two
different versions of an HIV confidentiality statute from 1987 to 1989 and
1989 to the present.'0 9 Under both versions of the law, AIDS test results
are confidential, subject to a permissive rule that allows, but does not
require, spouses to be told of a positive test result.110 The court held that
the notices to Balderas advising him of the risk of HIV infection consti-
tuted a "test result" under both the 1987 and 1989 versions. The 1987
version defined "test result" to include "any statement ... that any identi-
fiable individual is ... at risk ... or any other statement that indicates
that an identifiable individual has or has not been tested for AIDS or
HIV infection,"'' and the current (1989) law is not much different.
12
Thus, the question to be decided by the court was whether either version
of the law permitted Santa Rosa to share the "test result" with Ms. Gar-
cia. The court held no, based upon the requirement in both versions that
a spouse may be told only if the patient tests positive for HIV.113 Since
Balderas did not test HIV-positive until 1989, there could be no claim for
failure to warn Ms. Garcia before that time. The court also rejected her
argument that Santa Rosa owed her a common-law duty to advise her of
which lacked names, made surveillance, tracking, and follow-up difficult. See TEXAS DEP'T
OF HEALTH, BUR. OF HIV & STD PREVENTION, UNIQUE IDENTIFIER REPORTING FOR
HIV INFECTION SURVEILLANCE (Nov. 1997) (copy on file with author); HIV Reporting by
Name: Fact Sheet (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd/pdf/
hivname2.pdf> (copy on file with author). Despite comments that name-reporting would
deter testing and lead to breaches of confidentiality, TDH adopted the new rule, effective
January 1, 1999. See 23 Tex. Reg. 12669 (1998), adopted 23 Tex. Reg. 7696 (1998) (codified
at 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 97.131-.134, 97.139, 97.146).
106. See Santa Rosa Health Care Corp. v. Garcia, 964 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1998), rev'g 925
S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996).
107. See id. at 942 n.1.
108. See Garcia, 925 S.W.2d at 378.
109. See Garcia, 964 S.W.2d at 942-43.
110. See id. at 943.
111. Id. at 942.
112. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.101(5) (Vernon 1992).
113. See Garcia, 964 S.W.2d at 943.
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the risk of infection, finding that such a duty is precluded by the confiden-
tiality statute, which prohibited Santa Rosa from sharing a "test result"
with her before Balderas had tested positive for HIV. 114
B. SPOLIATION
When Genaro Ortega sued two physicians and a clinic for allegedly
negligent care and treatment during the birth of his daughter, he discov-
ered that the medical records he would need to prove his case had been
destroyed. He then filed a separate action based upon the independent
tort of spoliation of evidence. The trial court sustained the defendant's
special exception, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that
although there are no Texas cases allowing for the separate tort of spolia-
tion, there should be.' 1
5
The supreme court disagreed and reversed, reasoning that "[i]t is sim-
pler, more practical, and more logical to rectify any improper conduct
within the context of the lawsuit in which it is relevant.""16 The court
relied upon the existence of broad remedial powers with which the trial
judge may handle discovery abuses,117 as well as the fact that only six of
the twenty states that have decided the question have chosen to recognize
a separate tort for spoliation.
Hospitals are required by statute to preserve medical records for vari-
ous periods of time."18 The plaintiff in Trevino argued that he should be
able to pursue a claim against the clinic for breach of its statutory duty to
maintain medical records. Without deciding whether such a duty in fact
exists, or would be applicable to the defendant clinic, the court declined
the invitation to recognize a private cause of action for a violation of the
statute. 1 9
VII. MEDICAL DEVICES: FEDERAL PREEMPTION 120
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,121 the United States Supreme Court held
114. See id. at 944.
115. See Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997), rev'd,
969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998).
116. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953. The court was therefore noncommital on the question
whether there should be a separate tort of spoliation for the benefit of persons who are not
parties to the underlying lawsuit. See id. at 950.
117. See id. at 953.
118. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.103 (Vernon 1992 & Supp.
1999).
119. See Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953.
120. Where the law of medical-device regulation and the rules of federal statutory
preemption intersect is the LaBrea Tar Pit of American jurisprudence. This brief summary
of the Texas Supreme Court's recent foray into the intersection will not attempt to
explicate the intricacies of this area of the law. For a detailed analysis of the issues, the
reader might just as well begin with the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). For a helpful, pre-Medtronic guide to the
issues, see Ashley W. Warren, Preemption of Claims Related to Class III Medical Devices:
Are the Federal Objectives of Public Health and Safety Furthered or Hindered?, 49 SMU L.
REV. 619 (1996).
121. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
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that state tort claims were not preempted by federal law in the case of a
Class III medical device that had been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) through the relatively undemanding "§ 510(k)
process. '' 122 The high court left open the question whether federal law
would preempt state-law claims when the Class III device had gone
through the much more rigorous premarket approval (PMA) process.
23
That was the question posed to the Texas Supreme Court in Worthy v.
Collagen Corp., 24 in which the court was required to decide whether a
claim against the manufacturer of Zyderm® and Zyplast® (both inject-
able forms of collagen)-Class III medical devices approved through the
PMA process-is preempted by the federal Medical Device Amendments
of 1976 to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.12 5 The court held that
plaintiff's claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act were pre-
empted. 126 The court stopped short of holding that the PMA process au-
tomatically creates a preemptive effect, choosing instead to base its
decision upon a review of the specific PMA process for Zyderm® and
Zyplast® as well as the numerous decisions of other courts (both pre- and
post-Medtronic) that concluded that the FDA's approval of Zyderm®
preempted state-law claims that it was unsafe. 127
VIII. ORGAN AND TISSUE REMOVAL
Wendell Baker, Jr. was killed by police gunfire, a circumstance that
required an autopsy. 128 The medical examiner, Dr. Korndorffer, con-
sented to and did remove the decedent's corneal tissue pursuant to Texas
law. 129 According to the medical examiner, he was unaware that the de-
cedent's father had told an employee of the medical examiner that he
objected to the removal of any tissue that was not absolutely required to
perform the autopsy. The decedent's father, on the other hand, claimed
that he had voiced his objection to the employee, an assertion that the
employee denied. No one, including the decedent's father and the em-
122. Section 510(k) of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360e(b)(2), 360(k) (1994), allows the FDA to approve a medical device if it is shown to
be substantially equivalent to a medical device that had been approved before Congress'
enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.
123. The PMA process is described in detail in 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (1994). As noted
by the Texas Supreme Court, the FDA "spend[s] an average of 1,200 hours on each [PMAJ
submission," Worthy v. Collagen Corp., 967 S.W.2d, 360, 363 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 2372 (1998), affg 921 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1996), compared to the 20
hours the FDA devotes to the average § 510(k) submission, see id. at 370.
124. 967 S.W.2d at 360.
125. See id. at 362.
126. See id. at 377.
127. See id. at 375-76.
128. See Korndorffer v. Baker, 976 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1997, pet. filed). See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 49.25, §§ 6, 9 (Vernon Supp.
1999).
129. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 693.012 (Vernon 1992) (permitting
medical examiner to remove corneal tissue if, among other requirements, the parents of
the decedent do not object).
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ployee, claimed that any objection was in fact communicated to Dr.
Korndorffer.
The decedent's parents sued Dr. Korndorffer for the unauthorized re-
moval of their son's cornea, and Dr. Korndorffer moved for summary
judgment, relying primarily upon the immunity provision of section
693.014 of the Health and Safety Code.130 The Houston Court of Ap-
peals (First District) affirmed the decision of the trial court to deny the
motion for summary judgment. The statutory immunity is available only
in an action brought "by a person [such as the father of the decedent]
who did not object before the removal of the corneal tissue.' 131 Because
no one disputed the medical examiner's claim that he was not informed
of the father's alleged objections to removal of his son's corneas, the
medical examiner claimed that he was entitled to immunity from liability
under the statute. The court of appeals disagreed and held that an objec-
tion, for purposes of defeating the claim statutory immunity, could be one
of which the medical examiner personally knew, or it could be one of
which, in the normal operation of the medical examiner's office, the med-
ical examiner should have known. 132 The court held that a fact question
existed as to whether the medical examiner should have known of the
father's objections, and the trial court properly denied the medical exam-
iner's motion for summary judgment.133
IX. FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Although the focus of this Survey is developments in Texas law, a few
federal developments are sufficiently important to health care providers
and health law practitioners to warrant at least brief mention.
A. FALSE CLAIMS Acr
1. Constitutionality
In a one-of-a-kind holding, a federal district court in Texas has held
that a qui tam relator in a civil False Claims Act134 suit in which the gov-
ernment has not intervened lacks standing, thereby depriving the court of
subject-matter jurisdiction. In United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Hospital,1 35 a nurse brought suit under the False Claims Act
and alleged that her former employer had filed false claims for Medicare
and Medicaid reimbursement. 36 The government declined to proceed
130. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 693.014 (Vernon 1992).
131. Id. § 693.014(a).
132. See Korndorffer, 976 S.W.2d at 701.
133. See id. at 702.
134. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994).
135. 982 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
136. The False Claims Act provides that a person who "knowingly presents ... to an
officer or employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for
payment ... is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less that
$5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Govern-
ment sustains." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
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with the case, 137 and Ms. Riley proceeded with the action on her own.
Under the False Claims Act, if Ms. Riley prevailed she would be entitled
to "receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the pro-
ceeds of the action or settlement of the claim."'
38
The court dismissed the action, holding that Congress cannot create
Article III standing out of whole cloth simply by "assign[ing] the Execu-
tive's potential future interest in pursuing a particular fraud claim to an
unnamed, theoretical plaintiff who has suffered no injury."' 39 This con-
clusion contradicts every other decision that squarely decides the stand-
ing question 14" and was quickly rejected by at least one other federal
judge in the same district.' 4' The holding in Riley also seems plainly out
of step with, if not precluded by, the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer.142 In that
case, the defendant raised constitutional issues in its petition for certio-
rari, 143 but the Supreme Court declined to address them.144 If the Court
thought that a serious question existed as to the subject-matter jurisdic-
tion of Article III courts, it is literally inconceivable that it would have
passed over the constitutional issues raised in the petition for certiorari.
Indeed, even if petitioner had not raised the subject-matter jurisdiction
issue, the Court would have been required to address it on its own
motion. 45
2. Illegal Remuneration and Stark Claims
Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse, to oversimplify only a little,
may be divided into two types. One type is garden-variety billing fraud
that can take a number of different forms. Billing for services not ren-
dered, double-billing for services actually rendered, billing for services
rendered by a unqualified or unauthorized provider, and billing for un-
necessary services are but four examples.' 46 The harm that flows from
such practices is quite real, primarily in the form of fiscal harm to the
137. After receiving notice of the case from the relator, see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (re-
quiring private party to serve the government with a copy of the complaint and substan-
tially all material evidence and information in the relator's possession), the government
may either proceed with the case or decline, in which case the relator has the right to
pursue the claim in the government's name, see id. § 3730(b)(4).
138. Id. § 3730(d)(1). Under some circumstances, the relator's award may be limited to
10% of the proceeds. See id.
139. Riley, 982 F. Supp. at 1268.
140. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212-14 (7th
Cir. '1995); United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d
1148 (2d Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Northrop Corp., 824 F.
Supp. 830 (N.D. III. 1993).
141. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F.
Supp. 2d 1017, 1044-46 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
142. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
143. See 64 U.S.L.W. 3680 (April 9, 1996).
144. See Hughes, 520 U.S. at 944 n.3.
145. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
146. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(a) (West Supp. 1994).
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federal programs. 147 This is the classic type of fraud for which the federal
False Claims Act was designed: "to ensure the integrity of federal pro-
grams and the Federal Treasury by deterring submission of false and
fraudulent claims to the government, to provide restitution to the govern-
ment for money fraudulently taken from it, and to punish those who de-
fraud the government.
148
The second type of Medicare/Medicaid fraud and abuse includes (i)
illegal-remuneration offenses-relating to the payment of something of
value in return for patient referrals 149-and (ii) self-referral offenses
(also known as Stark violations, in honor of the California Congressman,
Fortney "Pete" Stark, who sponsored this legislation)-making referrals
to, or billing for services provided by, an entity in which the referring
physician has a financial interest. 150 This second category of fraud and
abuse is aimed at overutilization of program resources by prohibiting re-
lationships or payments that might provide a financial incentive for refer-
rers to order too many tests or an excessive length of stay in the hospital
or the like. Thus, the primary goal of the illegal-remuneration and self-
referral prohibitions is the fiscal integrity of the programs and the federal
treasury, just as it is with the garden-variety fraud provisions.
To prove an offense under either the illegal-remuneration prohibition
or Stark, however, it is not necessary to show that the improper payment
or the prohibited financial relationship in fact resulted in overutilization
or other inappropriate services or resulted in excessive charges against
the Medicare or Medicaid program. Indeed, provable overutilization and
similar types of misconduct fall squarely in the first category of fraud and
abuse, which makes it an offense to make a "false statement or represen-
tation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment" to
the Medicare or Medicaid program.151 Illegal remuneration and Stark
offenses are intended to be prophylactic, not simply retrospective and re-
medial, 152 so the mere making of an improper (with the requisite wrong-
147. Such practices may also harm program beneficiaries, who may receive unneeded
services, be deprived of needed services, or find their program benefits limited because of
the impact of such practices on future budgets.
148. Lisa Michelle Phelps, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting the Use of Al-
leged Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1003,
1007 (1998).
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 1999) (making it a crime to pay or to
receive, or to offer to pay or to offer to receive, anything of value, in cash or in kind,
directly or indirectly, in return for or to induce a referral for which the Medicare or Medi-
caid programs would be financially responsible).
150. See id. § 1395nn. The financial interests might be investment interests or compen-
sation arrangements, and the statute provides numerous exceptions to the prohibitions.
151. Id. § 1320-7b(a)(1).
152. As I said, this is an oversimplified picture of fraud and abuse. Illegal remunera-
tion, in addition to creating a financial incentive to overutilize, also imposes present harms
on the programs and their beneficiaries. They may curtail patients' freedom of choice of
provider and, on the theory that the money for kickbacks must come from somewhere,
represent a misallocation of program resources that would be better spent on needed pa-
tient services rather than for bribes. Whether these harms are truly harmful, and whether
they are the result of poor program design and excessive levels of reimbursement or are
the result of bad apples acting badly, is a debate best left for another time and place. For a
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ful intent) or of a prohibited referral-even absent a showing of harm to
the public-constitutes a violation of the illegal-remuneration or self-re-
ferral prohibition.
This raises the question whether a violation of either of these prohibi-
tions can also be a False Claims Act violation when the claim submitted
for payment accurately describes medically appropriate care that was ac-
tually provided by an appropriate provider. In other words, can an other-
wise proper claim for payment be, in the words of the False Claims Act,
"a false or fraudulent claim for payment"' 53 simply because a payment or
a financial interest constituted an illegal remuneration or self-referral?
Or does the False Claims Act require that the government or qui tam
relator show that the defendant's conduct resulted in financial harm to
the Medicare or Medicaid program?
In United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp.'5 4 the district court ruled that financial harm to the government
was required for a relator to state a claim under the False Claims Act:
"[The relator] has not stated a claim unless he has sufficiently alleged that
the defendants have submitted claims that are false or fraudulent (i.e.,
claims or claim amounts that the government would not have had to pay
but for the fraud)."' 55
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on this point, hold-
ing that "where the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon
a claimant's certification of compliance with, for example a statute or reg-
ulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she
falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regulation."'1 56 Thus, the
question for the district court to answer on remand was whether submis-
sion of claims for payment under Medicare necessarily entails certifica-
tion of compliance with the illegal-remuneration and Stark laws.' 57 On
remand, the district court held that Medicare payments are conditioned
upon a certification of compliance with all applicable federal laws and
without such a certification, the provider would not be paid.' 5 8 The result
of the Thompson case will be to lower the pleading requirements in the
Fifth Circuit for False Claims Act cases based upon violations of the ille-
version of that debate, see James F. Blumstein, Rationalizing the Fraud and Abuse Statute,
15 HEALTH AFF. 118 (1996); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon Davies, The Fraud and
Abuse Statute: Rationalizing or Rationalization?, 15 HEALTH AFF. 129 (1996).
153. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
154. 938 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd in part and vacated in part, 125 F.3d 899
(5th Cir. 1998).
155. Id. at 405. At least one other district court has ruled otherwise. See United States
ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
156. Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902.
157. The district court was also instructed to consider whether a Stark violation renders
false or fraudulent an otherwise valid claim in light of the Stark law's prohibition of both
the self-referral and the submission of a bill for services rendered in violation of the Stark
law. See id. at 903. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (West. Supp. 1999).
158. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F. Supp.
2d 1017, 1036 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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gal-remuneration and self-referral prohibitions and increase the utility of
qui tam actions as a tool against health care fraud.
B. EMTALA
In 1986 Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA) 159 to deal with the problem of "patient dumping"
- a practice by which a private hospital would arrange to transport pa-
tients who lack health insurance (usually coming in through the hospital's
emergency department) to a public hospital. As Texas did three years
later,160 Congress prohibited hospitals from transferring patients in need
of emergency care for nonmedical reasons, 161 but it also created two du-
ties that go beyond the hospitals' transfer obligations. First, hospitals are
required to "provide for an appropriate medical screening examina-
tion"'162 for all patients who come to the emergency department. Second,
if the patient is found to have an emergency medical condition, 163 the
hospital must "provide ... such treatment as may be required to stabilize
the medical condition" 164 or provide for an appropriate transfer.165
These statutory duties, however, are not explicitly or even conceptually
limited to "patient dumping" (i.e., transferring patients for economic
rather than medical reasons). Read literally, the statute may create a
cause of action any time a hospital fails to provide an "appropriate medi-
cal screening examination" or fails to stabilize the patient's emergency
medical condition-in short, any time a hospital's emergency room physi-
cians commit certain acts of medical malpractice.
Most federal courts agree that Congress did not intend to create a fed-
159. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 9121(b), 100 Stat. 82, 164 (1986), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994). Compliance with
EMTALA is an undertaking that is included in every hospital's provider agreement with
the Medicare program, a condition of participation in the Medicare program. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395f(a), 1395cc(a)(1)(1) (1994); 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.11(a), 489.20(), 489.24 (1998).
160. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 241.027-.028 (Vernon 1992 & Supp.
1999).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) (1994).
162. Id. § 1395dd(a).
163. EMTALA defines "emergency medical condition" as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate
medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in -
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant
woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious
jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contractions -
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another
hospital before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman
or the unborn child.
Id. § 1395dd(e)(1).
164. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A).
165. See id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B).
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eral emergency medical malpractice law,166 but they do not agree how to
avoid that result in light of the plain language of EMTALA. In Roberts v.
Galen of Virginia, Inc.167 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital
had transferred her to a lower level health care facility before her emer-
gency medical condition had been stabilized in violation of subsection (b)
of EMTALA. Affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the hospital, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that, in addition to pleading and proving that the hospital
transferred her before her emergency medical condition had been stabi-
lized, the plaintiff was also required to show that the hospital acted with
an improper motive, such as the plaintiff's "indigency or lack of insur-
ance[,] . . . race, sex, politics, occupation, education, personal prejudice,
drunkenness, or spite; that is, anything except medical negligence."'
68
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's
reading of EMTALA and reversed. 169 In its first-ever opinion to con-
sider EMTALA (a brief per curiam), the Court acknowledged the court
of appeals' desire to avoid reading EMTALA as a federal medical-mal-
practice statute for emergency care but held that "there is no question
that the text of § 1395dd(b) does not require an 'appropriate' stabiliza-
tion, nor can it reasonably be read to require an improper motive.
'170
166. The same point was made by the Houston Court of Appeals during the Survey
year. See Watts v. Hermann Hosp., 962 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.]
1997) ("The duty created by EMTALA is a 'limited' one in a very critical sense: 'EM-
TALA is not a substitute for state law malpractice actions, and was not intended to guaran-
tee proper diagnosis or to provide a federal remedy for misdiagnosis or medical
negligence."' (quoting Vickers v. Nashville Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir.
1996))). The Watts court did not need to address what limitations, if any, should be im-
posed on the statutory duty to stabilize, because it concluded that the plaintiff's emergency
condition had, in fact, been stabilized prior to his discharge from the hospital. See id. at
107.
167. 111 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999) (per curiam).
168. Id. at 409, relying on Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266
(6th Cir. 1990).
169. See Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999) (per curiam).
170. Id. at 687.
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